with Two Men and a Truck franchise location 1 · Two Men and a Truck franchise location 1
LenderHawk analysis. Not affiliated with or endorsed by Acquisitions Anonymous.
The buyer valued the route density, brand presence, and ability to lift margins through better labor management and pricing, but the transaction never closed for him.
In a moving business, direct labor is the main margin lever, so buyers should underwrite labor cost before getting excited about headline revenue.
Truck utilization can be a better operating benchmark than simple revenue growth; the guest uses roughly $20,000 per truck per month as an older rule of thumb and prefers closer to $25,000 now.
A location with weak EBITDA can still be attractive if a strategic buyer already knows the brand, pricing, and operating playbook.
A seller-owned real estate leaseback can be a serious issue when parking is tight, because truck storage can be more important than the building itself.
Older trucks with 200,000-plus miles can destroy the economics of an otherwise decent franchise because replacement capex becomes immediate.
Franchise deals often trade in-house first, and the franchisor may have approval power that affects who can actually close.
A business can be turned around quickly when the seller stays engaged and the buyer brings systems, reporting discipline, and labor management.
Customer conversion improves when the front-end sales process removes friction such as deposits and excessive intake questions.
Evaluate labor-heavy service businesses through two lenses: pricing power and true capital expense. The buyer has to know whether the market will support wages and what equipment replacement will cost as growth scales.
When to use: Use this when underwriting moving, staffing, home services, or any business where labor and fleet costs drive profitability.
One location was doing about $3 million of revenue while EBITDA had fallen from $184,000 in 2016 to negative $13,000 in 2017 and $1,700 in 2018.
Nathan used this as the first example of a struggling franchise location.
In a mature market at roughly $3 million of revenue, he said EBITDA should be about $500,000 to $600,000.
He used this benchmark to explain why the first franchise was underperforming.
The offer on the first location was $590,000 for 75% of the business, with $250,000 cash at close and the balance funded by seller note.
Nathan described the bid he made before the location sold elsewhere.
He heard the first business ultimately sold for over $1 million.
This was mentioned as the rumored final price after he was not selected.
The second location produced $1.2 million in revenue in 2017, $1.3 million in 2018, and $1.3 million in 2019.
These were the stated top-line figures before the turnaround transaction.
The second location's EBITDA was $68,000 in 2017, $86,000 in 2018, and $45,000 in 2019 before owner comp adjustments.
Nathan contrasted the pre-deal earnings trend with the post-close improvement.
After the turnaround, EBITDA rose to $261,000 in 2020 after paying the seller salary and the management fee.
He used this to show the effect of operational changes.
Nathan said a truck should ideally generate about $25,000 per month in revenue now, compared with an older $20,000-per-month rule of thumb.
This was his practical operating benchmark for the fleet.
The first deal involved 15 trucks, with 12 of the trucks or 9 of them having clear title and many over 200,000 miles.
He used the asset condition to justify the need for capex and a lower price.
Underwrite direct labor before anything else in a moving or other labor-based service business.
Why: Labor is the main driver of service-business margin, so a small percentage swing can change the whole deal.
Inspect truck age, mileage, and title status before agreeing to a franchise acquisition.
Why: Fleet replacement can become immediate capex and can erase the apparent value of the deal.
Treat parking capacity as a core diligence item when the business depends on trucks.
Why: If the site cannot park the fleet, the location can be operationally unusable even if the building looks fine.
Remove conversion friction from the phone and intake process when you want more bookings.
Why: The seller's business improved when deposits and extra questions were eliminated, allowing faster conversion and fewer voicemails.
Buy into a strategic brand only if the brand materially helps you generate volume faster than you could on your own.
Why: In a major market, the franchised brand can support marketing and trust in a way a standalone operator may not afford.
Nathan bid $590,000 for 75% of a mature location with collapsing EBITDA, but heard nothing for months and later learned a friend and strong operator closed it for more than $1 million. The outcome highlighted how much more a strategic could justify than an outsider, even on weak reported earnings.
Lesson: Strategic buyers can pay materially more when they have operating leverage and brand-specific knowledge.
A former professional who had funded the business with her 401(k) called Nathan after struggling to make the location work. They structured a new entity, bought the trucks, and gave her a 50% stake plus earned goodwill payments, then rapidly improved EBITDA through systems and better labor management.
Lesson: A motivated seller with good character can become a high-value partner when the operator brings the missing playbook.